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Abstract
This paper considers an economy with heterogeneous investors and an incomplete securities mar-
ket. Investors have non-traded income and private information about security payoffs. They
trade in the market to allocate the risk from their non-traded income and to speculate on secu-
rity payoffs. We use the model to examine the equilibrium allocation of risk and the behavior of
security prices under different market structures, as defined by the characteristics of all traded
securities in the market. In particular, we examine how the addition of derivatives securities
affects the trading and prices of existing securities and both the allocational and informational
efficiencies of the market. We show that the introduction of derivatives can decrease informa-
tional efficiency of the market on security payoffs, increase risk premium and price volatility in
the market.
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1. Introduction.
Securities market plays two important roles: to allocate risks and to communicate information
among investors [see, e.g., Arrow (1964), Debreu (1959), Hayek (1945)]. How efficient the
market performs these two roles crucially depends on the market structure, as defined by a
complete characterization of traded securities. The continuous emergence of new securities in
the market and the trading volume they can generate provide clear evidence to this dependence.
In the literature, how changes in market structure (such as introducing new securities) may
affect its allocational and informational roles are mostly studied in separation. For example,
in analyzing the informational impact of opening derivative trading, the allocational trading in
the markht is often specified exogenously (as "noise") [see, e.g., Grossman (1977)]. As argued
eloquently by Grossman (1995), the informational efficiency of the securities market and its
allocational function are fundamentally related. The introduction of futures contracts on S&P
500 stock index, say, not only allows investors to communicate their information on future
distributions of the index through futures prices, but also changes future distributions of the
index itself since now investors can use futures, in addition to existing securities, to achieve
different allocations of the index risk. The interaction between the two roles of the market,
allocational and informational, is important in determining the impact of changes in market
structure. It is this interaction and its effect on the impact of derivative trading that we want
to study in this paper.
We considers an economy in which investors have non-traded income and private information
about security payoffs. The securities market consists of a risk-free security (bond) and a risky
security of non-zero supply (stock) as primary securities, and possibly a futures-type derivative
security on the stock. Investors trade in the market to allocate the risk from their non-traded
income and to speculate on security prices. We solve the equilibrium allocations and security
prices under two different market structures, consisting of, respectively, only the primary securi-
ties, and the primary securities as well as the derivative security. We examine how the addition
of derivative securities changes the trading and prices of existing securities, and how it affects
the allocational and informational efficiencies of the market.
In the absence of asymmetric information, the market structure only affects the risk alloca-
tions in the market. With the securities market being incomplete, investors are often unable to
optimally share the aggregate risk and to perfectly hedge the individual risks. Security prices
not only depend on the aggregate risk, but also depend on investors' individual risks. The in-
troduction of derivative securities then allows investors to better allocate the risks. It tends to
decreases the premium on equity and its price volatility.
When there exists information asymmetry among investors, the market also plays the role
of transmitting information. The introduction of derivative securities not only affects the effi-
ciency of the market in allocating risk, but also its efficiency in aggregating and revealing private
information [see, e.g., Grossman (1977)]. On the one hand, additional prices of the new secu-
rities provide more endogenous signals investors can learn from about other investors' private
information. On the other hand, the expanded trading opportunities allow investors to better
allocate risks, and increase the amount of allocational trading in the market. The increase in
allocational trading can generate additional price movements in traded securities, hence make
them less informative about investors' private information on security payoffs. In fact, open-
ing derivative trading can worsen the informational efficiency of the market. Contrast to the
case of symmetric information, opening derivative trading can increase stock premium and price
volatility.
The economy we consider has heterogeneous investors, incomplete securities market with non-
traded income and asymmetric information. Many authors have considered the effect of market
incompleteness and non-traded income on investors' optimal investment behavior.1 Market in-
completeness and the presence of non-traded income often make investors' optimization problem
difficult to solve, and the results on optimal policies are quite limited. Analyzing market equi-
librium with non-traded income then becomes more difficult and is mostly done by numerical
methods.2 The existence of asymmetric information makes the problem even more formidable.3
Our approach here is to impose specific restrictions on investors' preferences and shock distri-
butions, which allows us to obtain closed form solutions of the equilibrium under asymmetric
information and different market structures. We sacrifice on generality for the benefit of being
able to analyze in more detail investors' portfolio policies, equilibrium security prices and allo-
cational and informational efficiencies under different market structures. The intuition obtained
from the model can be helpful in understanding more general models.
The literature on the informational role of derivatives market includes the first formal discus-
sion of Grossman (1977), using a single-period model, and more recently the work of Grossman
(1988), Back (1993) and Brennan and Cao (1995), using multiperiod models. All these papers
'For example, He and Pearson (1991) and Karatzas, Lehoczky, Shreve and Xu (1991) examine the existence and
characterization of optimal consumption and investment policies (with finite horizon) under incomplete market.
Merton (1971), He and Pag&s (1993), Duffie, Fleming and Zariphopoulou (1993), Svensson and Werner (1993),
Koo (1994a,b), Cuoco (1995), among others, consider the problem when investors also have non-traded income.
2For equilibrium pricing models with non-traded income, see, e.g., Scheinkman and Weiss (1986), Lucas (1990),
Marcet and Singleton (1990), Telmer (1993), Heaton and Lucas (1995), and Detemple (1995).
3 Wang (1993) and Detemple (1994) solve multiperiod pricing models under asymmetric information with spe-
cific assumptions on preferences and shock distributions. Judd and Bernardo (1994) consider numerical solutions
to equilibrium models under asymmetric information.
use the noisy rational expectations framework, where the allocational trading is introduced ex-
ogenously. We, however, use a fully rational expectations framework and explicitly model both
the allocational and informational trading in the market. For example, investors' demand in the
derivatives securities after their introduction is derived endogenously from their optimal con-
sumption and investment policies. This allows us to analyze the allocational and informational
efficiency of the securities market, and their interaction in a unified framework.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the model. Section 3 considers a
benchmark case in which the securities market is complete. The equilibrium of the economy is
analyzed under symmetric and asymmetric information in section 4 and 5, respectively, with
incomplete markets. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are given in the appendix.
2. The model.
We consider an economy of a single good (taken also as the numeraire) defined on a continuous
time-horizon [0, co). The economy consists of two classes of investors, denoted by i = 1, 2, with
population weight w and 1-w, respectively. Investors within the same class are identical. For
convenience, we will also refer to any investor in class-i as investor i, i = 1, 2.
Let (2, F., P) be a complete probability space, where 2 is the set of states of nature describing
the exogenous environment of the economy on [0, co), F the a-algebra of distinguishable events,
and P the probability measure on (2, F). The uncertainty of the economy is generated by an
n-dimensional standard Wiener process defined on (, .F, P), denoted by w. The exogenous
information flow is given by the augmented filtration {Ft : t E [0, o) }, which are a-algebras of
F generated by w.
There is a competitive securities market with m + 1 traded securities, indexed by k =
0, 1, ... , m. A complete specification of all the traded securities defines the structure of the
securities market. In this paper, security 0 is assumed to be a risk-free security (bond) with
the price Bt = ert where t > 0 and r is a positive constant. The remaining securities are risky.
Let Ck,t be the cumulative cash flow on security k (k > 1), Pk,t its market price, Ct and Pt,
respectively, the cumulative cash flow and price vector of all risky securities. In particular,
security 1 is a risky security (stock) with a total number of shares outstanding being one (per
capita), and pays a flow of dividends. Let the cumulative dividend process Dt on the stock be
given by
Dt = Gds + bodws (la)
Gt = Go + eaG(t-)bGdws (Ib)
where t E [0, 00), aG < 0 is a negative constant, bD and bG are constant matrices of proper
order. Thus, the dividend paid on the stock from t to t + dt is dDt = Gtdt + bodwt, where Gt
gives the persistent component in the dividend and bodwt the idiosyncratic component. We will
use St to denote the stock price at t. The remaining securities, i.e., for k > 1, are assumed to
be contingent claims of zero net supply. In particular, as security 2 we introduce a derivative
security which pays a cash flow at the rate equal to the current stock price St. This security is
similar to a collar contract in interest rate swaps, hence will be called the collar from now on. Let
Ht denote the collar price at t.4 For any claim traded in the market, being enforceable requires
that its payoff can only be contingent on states of the economy observable to all investors. When
all investors have perfect information about the underlying state of the economy, the payoff of
a contingent claim can in general be made dependent on realizations of the underlying state.
When investors do not all observe the underlying state, the payoff of a traded security should
only depend on publicly observable states. It is for this reason that we consider the addition of
derivative securities such as the collar in changing the market structure since its payoff depends
only on market prices of other traded securities.
In addition to the traded securities, each class of investors are also endowed with non-traded
income. Let Ni,t denote the cumulative non-traded income of investor i, i = 1, 2. It is given by
Ni,t = j (,i,yYs + /3i,zZ s ) dNs (2a)
Yt = Yo + e y(t-s)bydw (2b)
Zt = Zo + eaz(t-s)bzdw, (2c)
Nt = bNWt (2d)
where i = 1, 2, ay, az are negative constants, b,, by, bz are constant matrices of proper order.
For simplicity, we have assumed that all the non-traded income are risky (i.e., there is no drift
for the non-traded income process), and dNt characterizes shocks to the non-traded income.
(3i,vYt+i3,zZt) then determines investor i's total exposure to the risk of non-traded income.
(Extending the current model to allow a linear drift is straightforward.)5
Investors may have different information about the economy. They observe the dividend
4The collar contract defined here represents a series of bets on future stock prices. For positive stock prices,
St > 0, the long side of the contract receives payments at rate St, while for negative stock prices, the short side
receives payments at rate -St. Note that payments here are in the form of continuous flows instead discrete
lumps.
5Here we have assumed that investors' non-traded risks (all determined by Nt) are perfectly correlated. In-
troducing additional independent shocks is straightforward and does not change any qualitative nature of our
results.
payments and market prices of all traded securities, their own exposure to the non-traded risk
and realizations of their non-traded income. However, they may have different information
concerning the rate of dividend growth Gt and other investors' exposure to the non-traded risk.
Let Fi,t denote the filtration generated by the information set of investor i at t E [0, oo) and
yt{C 'P} denote the filtration generated by the path of prices and dividends {Ct, Pt}, which is
the public information set. Clearly, F {c, P  C T i,t gC Ft, i = 1, 2. The investors' information
sets will be specified in detail in the different situations to be considered.
For investor i (i = 1, 2), let {ci,t : t E [0, oo)} be his consumption policy and {Oi,t : t E oo}
his trading policy where 9 i,t denotes his holdings in the risky securities at t. His policy is
adapted to .Ti,t. Consumption policies are restricted to integrable processes, and trading policies
are restricted to predictable, square-integrable processes with respect to the gain processes of
traded securities [see, e.g., Harrison and Pliska (1981) for a discussion on the requirement of
square-integrability]. (Here, the integrability is defined over any finite horizon [0, T]).
In order to obtain solutions of the equilibrium, we assume that all investors maximize the
expected utility of the following form:
E [- j e-P(s-t)-Y ds Fi,t , i = 1, 2 (3)
where p and y (both positive) are the time discount coefficient and the relative risk-aversion
coefficient, respectively.
The economy as defined above exhibits the following features. The securities imarket is in
general incomplete when m < n, i.e., the number of risky securities is less than the dihieiision of
uncertainty [see, e.g., Harrison and Kreps (1979) for a formal definition of market cor pletelelss].
The existence of non-traded income and its correlation with returns on traded securiti,. will
generate trading in the market for allocational reasons, i.e., investors will use the sec'urities
market to allocate the risk of their non-traded income. The existence of asymmetric i•lforimation
in the market about the stock's future payoffs gives rise to the informational tradiilg amliong
investors. They speculate in the market based on their private information aw(ld expect to
earn excess returns. Although the prices of all risky securities will be determined by iriarket
equilibrium, the prices of the risk-free security has been exogenously specified for tractability.
The assumption of constant absolute risk-aversion implies that investors' holdings of t he risky
securities may be independent of their wealth. This assumes away any income efrect oil the
investors' trading policies (for the risky securities) and consequently the equilibrium prices.
In this paper, we consider two possible structures of the securities market. The first market
structure is when the stock and the bond are the only traded securities. The second market
structure is when the collar is also traded in the market, in addition to the stock and the bond.
We will denote these two market structures as I and II, respectively.
In what follows, we use upper case letters to denote random variables and lower case letters
to denote deterministic variables (e.g., constants) with only a few exceptions. We use con-
ventional notation c and 9 for investors' choice variables, consumption and security holdings,
respectively, and w for standard Wiener processes. For a set of elements (of proper order), let
diag {al, a2 , .. , ak}, (, a2, *2,*, ak) and stack{al, a 2 , .* ., ak} denote, respectively, the diagonal
matrix, row matrix and column matrix with elements al, a2 , - . -, ak. Also let t denote the identity
matrix of any order and trace(.) denote the trace of a matrix. Furthermore, we introduce the in-
dex matrix 1 k,;k') defined as a (kxk') matrix with its (j, j') element being 1 and all other elements
being zero. Also, for any two random variables X 1,t and X 2,t, where dXj,t = aj,tdt + bj,tdwt,
j = 1, 2, let ajj, = bib , denote the instantaneous cross-variation between Xj and Xj, and
a - ajj, j,j' = 1, 2 [see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve (1988) for a discussion of cross-variation
-1/2 -1/2processes]. Also define yjj, =- j/2 1oj,j, as the instantaneous cross correlation.
In order to be more specific, we further assume that w has the following decomposition
wt = stack{wD,t, wG,t, Wy,t, WZ,t, WN,t}, where all the components are standard Wiener processes
and mutually independent. (wD,t, WG,t, etc., need not be one-dimensional, although they can be
assumed so in most of future discussions.) Furthermore, we assume
bD = o(, 0 0, 0,,O), bG =, G (0, , 0, 0, 0)
by = y(0, 0,t, 0,0), bz = ay(0, 0, 0,t, 0), bN=c N(F KD t 0, 0, 0V X .
This specification about the underlying shocks to the economy has simple interpretations. In
particular, wD,t and wG,t characterize shocks to the stock's dividend flow, wy,t and wz,t char-
acterize shocks to investors' exposures to the non-traded risk. All the shocks are mutually
independent. The above assumptions about the b's impose specific structure on the correlation
among the shocks. In particular, stock dividends and investors' non-traded income are corre-
lated when 'DN # 0. To fix ideas, we maintain the assumption that 'DN > 0 in our future
discussions. The specific correlation structure assumed here will simplify our analysis without
great loss of generality on the points we want to make.
For future convenience, define IPt - stack{1, Dt, Nt, Gt, Yt, Zt} as the vector of underlying
state variables, and Xt - stack{1,Gt,Yt, Zt}, Xt = stack{1,Yt,Zt} as two sub-state vectors.
(Here, a constant is included as the first component of the state vector to simplify presentation.)
Both Xt and Xt follow Gaussian Markov processes:
dXt = axXtdt + bxdwt
dXt = agXtdt + bkdwt
where ax = diag{0, aG, ay,aZ}, bx = stack{0, bG, by, bz}, ay = diag{O,ay,az}, and bk =
stack{0,by,bz}. Let /i = stackO,{0 ,y, 3i,,z}, i = 1,2. (Here, we use 0 to denote matrices
.of zeros without specifying their order, which can be inferred from the context.) Investor i's
non-traded income can then be expressed as
Ni,t = X 3ibvdws, i = 1, 2.
Also define
Ft E [ e-r(s-t)dCs t]
which gives the expected values of future cash flows on all risky securities, discounted at the risk-
free rate..In particular, for the stock, FtS = Gt, bs = 1 bDand ' = bsbs'. Furthermore,
-Ir-aG F F
let
dQt = dCt + dPt - rPtdt
denote the vector of excess share returns of all risky securities. Its first component dQl =
dDt + dSt - rStdt gives the dollar return on one share of stock financed by borrowing at the
risk-free rate. Similarly, its second component dQ' = Stdt+dHt-rHtdt gives the excess share
return on the collar.
Prices of all risky securities are determined by the equilibrium of the economy. The equi-
librium notion here is the standard one of rational expectations [see, e.g., Radner (1972)]. It
is defined as the price process {Pt} such that investors adopt consumption and trading policies
that maximize their expected utility
Ji,t = sup E [- e-P(s-t-Ycts dsFi,t] (4)
s.t. dWi,t = (rWi,t-ci,t)dt + 0•, t dQt + dNi,t
where i = 1, 2, and the market clears
WOl,t + (1-w)02,t = Il1 " (5)
The transversality condition of the Merton type (1971) will be imposed on investors' control
problem: lims,,o E [Ji,, Fi,t] = 0.6 We only consider stationary equilibrium of the economy.
Furthermore, we maintain the following conditions on the parameters throughout the paper:
r-2ay r-2az
oN 2Y <  y 2V< r" (6)1/2_ry 1 2v'20ry
6For the infinite horizon control problem to have well posed solutions, appropriate boundary conditions are
needed. Imposing the above transversality condition is equivalent to the following procedure: first solve the
control problem with finite horizon and a bequest function of the terminal wealth in the same form of the utility
function, and then let the terminal date goes to infinity.
in order to guarantee the existence of linear equilibrium. (6) requires that the variability in
investors' non-traded income cannot be too large.
3. The benchmark case of complete market.
In this paper, the securities market is incomplete in general. Before analyzing the general cases,
we first consider the case in which the market is complete as a benchmark case. It provides some
basic understanding about the economy, which is useful in analyzing more complicated cases.
With complete securities market, prices fully reveal investors' private information (or provide
an efficient aggregation)."
In equilibrium, investors are equally informed. Or equivalently, we can start by assuming
the same information set for all investors. For simplicity we assume Fi,t = Ft, i = 1, 2. Without
loss of generality, also let wl3 ,y + (1-w)/32 ,y = 1 and 3z = w/l,z + (1-w)02,z •< 1 in this section.
Since the market is complete, investors can completely eliminate the idiosyncratic risks in
their non-traded income. Consequently, the equilibrium allocation and security prices only
depend on the aggregate risk, including the risk in the stock's future payoffs and aggregate
exposure to non-traded risk. Since the equilibrium allocation and security prices does not
depend on the market structure imposed as long as it satisfies the spanning property [see, e.g.,
Duffie and Huang (1985)] , we omit detailed specifications of the market structure. We have the
following theorem:
Theorem 1 When .Fi,t = Ft V t and the market is complete, the economy has a unique linear,
stationary equilibrium. In particular, investors' value function is Ji,t = -e - pt - r •w ~ -+'"
their optimal consumption policy is
Ct = rWi,t - -fvXt - In r2y
the stock price is
St- 1 Gt + ýskt
r-a G
where
s -ryODN [vYZ2 + (r-az-Z vZZ)1
7When investors have asymmetric information, appropriate enforcement mechanism is needed to introduce
securities with payoffs contingent on state variables that are not publicly observable: Otherwise, it would be
infeasible to include these securities in the market. This may be one of the reason the actual market is incomplete.
If, however, the contractual terms of traded securities can be enforced by a court with superior information on
the true state variables, then any state-contingent claims can be traded in the market.
As -r DN YZ Y 6 YY1
S(r-az-ivzz)(r-ay-r,,vyy) - vUzUoBa
As 2 12 +  2 +A+ 20,2
0 =D + r -- ) 2a
and v is a (3 x 3) constant matrix given in appendix A.2. For any other traded security k > 1
with cumulative payoff Ct = fot f(Xt, t)dt + bcdws, its price at t is P(Xt, t). If P(Xt, t) is twice
differentiable with respect to Xt and once differentiable with respect to t, it then satisfies the
following equation:
rP= OtP+ f +X'a'xOxP + tr (Oxx&8P) -[ryASbx + (rypbN-vbx) Xt](b'xJxP+b'c) (7)
where 3 '= (0, 1, 3z), OxP denotes the vector of first order derivatives of P with respect to
elements of X, 021P the matrix of second order derivatives, and OtP its derivative with respect
to t.8
No statements about investors' security holdings are made since no specification of the traded
securities is given (other than the bond and the stock).
In order to better understand the results, we consider the simple case when Zt = 0 V t
and Yt fully characterizes the aggregate exposure to non-traded risk. In this case, we can write
v = diag{ voo, vyy, 0},
vn = (22)-' [(r-2a,) - /(r-2ay)2 - 4(r0)2c~i~ > 0
12 2
voo = -1 ov2 + r7'Aj +± -(r-p-rln r)
r r
and As = -ryDN(-ay- 2vyy) and As = -y[2+,2 +(Asay) 2]. Furthermore, vyy, IA31 and
jAsI increase with ay. It then follows that investors' optimal consumption decreases with their
exposure to non-traded risk (i.e., ci,t decreases with Yt holding wealth constant). This reflects
the investors' precautionary saving. When investors face higher risk in their future non-traded
income, their marginal utility for future consumption increases. Given the interest rate, they
want decrease current consumption and save more for future consumption.
The stock price is a simple linear function of the underlying state variables, St = '- Gt +
Ag + AsYt. The first term Gt gives the expected value of the stock's future cash flowr-ao
discounted at the risk-free rate. Ag+AVYt then gives the risk premium on the stock. The constant
component of the risk premium A' is simply proportional to the investors' risk aversion and the
instantaneous variance of the stock price. This is because that investors' consumption co-varies
8For Xt = (1, Gt, Yt, Z,)', its variable elements are Gt, Y,, Zt. Let X,, i = 1, ... ,n, be the variable elements
of X, then ax P = stack {• , f " , } and 9x P = {x,
linearly with the stock price (since their wealth does). The covariance between consumption
changes and stock returns, which determines the premium, then increases linearly with the
variance of stock returns.
The time-varying component of the risk premium is linear in Yt with proportionality coeffi-
cient >.. It is easy to show that r-ay-a2vy,  0. Hence, As has the opposite sign of aoD.
Note that ODN being positive implies positive correlation between shocks to investors' non-traded
income and shocks to the stock's payoff. Investors want to use the stock to hedge the risk in
their non-traded income. When Yt > 0, investors have a positive exposure to the non-traded
risk. Hence, they would like to short the stock in order to reduce the overall risk of their future
income. In equilibrium, the stock price has to decrease. Thus As is negative when aDN > 0.
Also, IA'yj increases with oy, the variability in the aggregate exposure to non-traded risk. As
oy increases, investors' expected utility becomes more sensitive to changes in the exposure to
non-traded risk (i.e., vyy increases). Consequently, they use the stock (as well as other traded
securities) to hedge more actively against these changes. The stock price then becomes more
sensitive to Yt, hence IAsI increases.
The price of any derivative securities must satisfy the pricing equation (7). Given the ap-
propriate boundary conditions of a security, its price can be obtained by solving (7). As an
example, we solve for the collar price. It pays a dividend at a rate equal to current stock price.
Ht should be a function of Xt only, independent of the calendar time t, i.e., Ht = H(Xt). Given
that Xt follows a Gaussian Markov process, it can be shown that H(.) is linear. Thus.
Ht = H(Xt) = AHXt (H)
where AH = (HAH, A", AH AH ) is a constant matrix. Substitute this into equation (7). we obtain
AH =S [rt-ax+(ry)oxxA1 (1,4 ) + (ry TXN-XYyy) 1 (1,4)
which fully specifies the equilibrium collar price. (The matrix in the square bracket is full
ranked.)
4. The case of symmetric information.
We now consider the case of incomplete market, but with symmetric information, and examine
how market incompleteness affects the allocation of risk among investors and security prices.
Again, we assume .Fi,t = YFt, i = 1, 2. We start with some general discussions about the
equilibrium of the economy, and then examine the equilibrium under market structures I and
II, respectively.
4.1. General discussions on equilibrium.
For the risky securities we allow in market structure I and II (stock and collar), their payoffs are
governed by Gaussian processes with drifts linear the underlying state vector lt, which follows
a Gaussian Markov process itself. In particular, we can write
Ct = JAcXds +bcdw
Given the constant risk-aversion preferences of the investors, the equilibrium can exhibit certain
linearity [see, e.g., Campbell and Kyle (1992) and Wang (1993)]. Thus, we restrict our analysis
to the linear equilibrium of the economy which requires
Pt = APXt
for prices of all traded securities. Here, Ac = (Ac, Ac, Ac , A ), AP = (Ag, AP, AP, AP) and b, are
(m x 4) constant matrices. The process of excess share returns is then
dQt = aQXtdt + bQdwt
where aQ = \A(ax - rt)+Ac and bQ = A"bx + bc. Thus, Xt fully characterizes the expected
exdcess share returns on all risky securities considered here. Also, let AC = (Ag, Ac, Ac) and
AP = (Ag, AP, AP) denote the sub-vectors of Ac and AP that correspond to Xt, respectively.
We have the following result concerning the properties of the linear, stationary equilibrium
of the economy:
Proposition 1 Suppose that Yi,t = F•t V t, i = 1, 2. In a linear, stationary equilibrium of the
economy, the price vector has the form
Pt = APXt, (9)
investor i's optimal policies (i = 1, 2) are
ci,t= rWi,t - --1 vitt - In r, Oit = hi,tt (10)
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and his value function Ji, = -e-P t-~PrYw, 1x tvtx, where i = 1, 2,
1 1
hi,t = 10QQ- (aQ+gQkv--ra-QNIP) ,
aQ = AP(a,-rt)+Ac, bQ = APbx + bc, oQQ = bQb', and AP, vi satisfy
0 = (ry)2'hioQhi - (rYibN - vibx) (rPibN - vibx)'+rvi - (viax +a'i) - , 1'4 (Il a)
1wi ,4) = whl + (1- )h2 (11b)
with vi = 2(r-p-rIln r) + tr {b'xvibx}, and As , vi are constant matrices.
Note that the expected excess share returns on traded securities depend only on Xt, the vector
of state variables that affects investors' exposure to non-traded risk, and so do the investors'
investment-consumption policies and their value functions. In particular, the expected excess
share return on the stock is independent of expectations about its payoffs, which is determined
by Gt.
Following Merton (1971, 1989), we can interpret investors' security holdings as consists of
three sets of portfolios. The first portfolio is the growth portfolio, agaQXt. The second set of
portfolios, defined by each column of aoa*Q., are portfolios used to hedge changes in the state
variables. The third portfolio, defined by a-eQ,, is the portfolio used to hedge the risk in
non-traded income. Investor i's holding in these three sets of portfolios are (ry)-', (ry)-'viXf
and ýIX, respectively.
In the remainder of this section, we let w = 1/2, 3i,y = 1 and 3i,z = (-1)i- 1, i = 1, 2. In
this case, Yt characterizes the aggregate exposure to non-traded risk and Zt characterizes the
idiosyncratic exposure.
4.2. Under market structure I.
We now consider the case when the stock and the bond are the only traded securities. The
market is incomplete in this case since there are no securities that allow investors to perfectly
hedge their non-traded risk (as characterized by dNt) as well as changes in their exposures to
non-traded risk [as characterized by (03i,yYt + Li,zZt)]. We have the following result on the
equilibrium of the economy:
Theorem 2 When -Fi,t = .Ft V t, w = 1/2, ji,y = 1, 3i,z = (-1)i - 1, i = 1, 2, and under market
structure I, the economy has a linear, stationary equilibrium of the form in proposition 1 for
small values of az. In particular, the stock price and investors' stock holdings are
St- = -- Gt + t
r- aG
Oi,t = 1 + aDN (O'qNui,z - Asovi,yZ) Zt
where As and vi are determined by equation (11) with aQ = AS (ak-ri) and bQ = ASbx+bD.
Given the symmetry between the two classes of investors, the aggregate exposure is evenly
allocated among themselves. Changes in aggregate exposure would not generate trading among
investors since it affects everyone the same way. Investors' stock holdings only depend on their
idiosyncratic exposures to the non-traded risk.
Since the market is incomplete now, the equilibrium stock price and allocation in general
depend on investors' idiosyncratic exposure to non-traded risk. In particular, investors have
to use the stock to hedge their non-traded risks. This leads to inefficiencies in both allocating
aggregate risk and mutually insuring individual risks. In order to develop some intuition about
the equilibrium allocations and the stock price, we first consider special cases in which the
aggregate arid idiosyncratic exposures to the non-traded risk do not coexist and then discuss
the more general case in which they do.
4.2.1. With only aggregate non-traded risk.
One special situation is when there is no idiosyncratic exposure in investors' non-traded risk, i.e.,
when Zt = 0 V t. In this case, all investors are identical and the market is effectively complete
[see, e.g., Lucas (1978)]. The equilibrium allocation and the stock price are the same as in the
case of complete market, which are given in theorem 1.
4.2.2. With only idiosyncratic non-traded risk.
Another special situation is when there is no aggregate exposure in investors' non-traded risk,
i.e., when Pi,Y = 0. Investors, however, do face idiosyncratic non-traded risk, which cannot
be eliminated. The equilibrium then has the form in proposition 1 with As = (A, 0, 0) and
hi = (1,0, hi,z) where A = -y(ao2 +a2), hi,z = 3i,,Z0DN/(a2+a2) and
Vi,zz = Zl (r-2az)- (r- 2az)2 - 4(rN)2 a2 -( r-1QQ DN-2
Sry2 )_ 0  N DN
vi,oz (rT)2 , i,z, vi,oo = -ry 2 ( ,2+0,0)+12z(V oz+Vi,zz),- 2+(r-p-rln r).
r -az - vizz r r
In this case, the distribution of investors' exposure to non-traded risk, as determined by az and
az, does no affect the equilibrium stock price. As a matter of fact, the stock price is the same
here as in the case of complete market (without non-traded risk at the aggregate level). Given
any idiosyncratic exposure of the individual investors to the non-traded risk, some investors sell
the stock while others buy to hedge their non-traded risk. With the perfect symmetry among
investors in this case, the net buying/selling will be zero. All the trades can be accommodated
without moving the price. Investors' utility, however, does depend on the distribution of their
exposure to non-traded risk since they cannot perfectly insure their individual through the
securities market. The stock only provides an imperfect hedge. When an investor uses the stock
to hedge, he incurs the basis risk from price movements as Gt changes. Increasing aG increases
the basis risk and decreases |hi,z , hence decreases investors' hedging activities.
4.2.3. With both aggregate and idiosyncratic non-traded risk.
When there are both aggregate and idiosyncratic components in investors' exposures to the
non-traded risk, the interaction between them will affect the stock price and investors' trading
policies. In this case, we no longer have closed form solutions to the equilibrium. Thus we rely
on numerical solutions to equation (11) in analyzing the equilibrium.
Since our future discussions will be based on numerical illustrations, a few comments are in
order. Given the large number of parameters in the model, only the results for a small range of
parameter values are presented for brevity. The parameter values are chosen to be compatible
to the estimated price process in Campbell and Kyle (1993), which has the linear form similar
to ours. The remaining degrees of freedom are used to fix a particular set of parameter values
which can generate simultaneously all the results in the paper. As a cost, some of the effects
may seem small for this particular set of parameter values even though they can be larger for
other parameter values. When a particular result under consideration changes qualitatively
with certain parameters, we try to show the changes by varying the relevant parameters in the
numerical illustrations or to discuss them verbally. However, our exploration of the parameter
space and the results presented in the paper are by no means exhaustive.
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Figure 1: Stock price coefficients plotted against ay and uz under symmetric information and market
structure I. The parameters are set at the following values: p = 0.1, y = 20, r = 0.05, a0 = -0.2,
ay = -0.2, az = -0.5, 9o = 0.7, aG = 0.2, cN, = 0.2, KoN = 0.6.
Figure 1 shows how As and As change with ar and az, measuring the variability in aggregate
and individual exposures to the non-traded risk, respectively. Same as in the case of complete
market, A' and A' are both negative and their absolute values increase with ay. Furthermore,
as we increase the dispersion between the investors in non-traded risk oz, both jIAI and IjA1
increase. This is different from the results in the absence of the aggregate non-traded risk. When
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investors face more idiosyncratic risk, which cannot be completely hedged away due to market
incompleteness, the aggregate risk becomes even more undesirable since it is correlated with the
idiosyncratic risks. This implies that the absolute value of AS increases and so does the price
volatility. Consequently, the stock's risk premium as measure by IASI increases.
We now examine investor 1's trading strategies. Given that his stock holding is a linear
function of the underlying state variables, OSt = hso+h ~,Yt+hf,zZt, we can simply look at the
coefficients, h1,0, hl,y and hi,z, which characterizes the intensity of his trading in response to the
shocks. Given the symmetry between the two classes of investors in the current case, h s o = 1
and hs , = 0, implying that on average each investor holds his market share of the stock and
bears equal amount of the aggregate non-traded risk. However, hf,z is not zero, reflecting the
trading between the two classes of investors to mutually share their individual risks. Figure 2
illustrates how hl,z changes with oy and az. Note the h2,z = -hl,z as the market clearing
condition requires. hs , is negative (for aDN > 0) since investor 1 wants to short the stock when
he has a positive exposure to non-traded risk.
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Figure 2: Investor l's trading policies under symmetric information and market structure I plot tI d again.,st
ay and az. The parameters are set at the following values: p = 0.1, y = 20, r = 0.05, aG = -0.2. (1 = -0.2.
az = -0.5, oa = 0.7, ao = 0.2, aN = 0.2, rDN = 0.6.
As oy and az change, two factors affect the intensity of the hedging activity. ivieasulred by
hlI,zI, First, when ay or az increases, the stock price becomes more volatile (since A. inlcreases).
Taking any stock positions becomes riskier and investors hence reduce their trading in hedging
individual risks. Second, increasing oy or az makes investors' expected utility more sewisitive to
changes in their exposures to non-traded risk, hence increases their trading in hedginog against
these changes. The net effect of an increase in ay or oz on hl1,zj depends on the trade off
between these two factors. For the parameters chosen in figure 2, Ihl,zI increases with a,- or az.
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4.3. Under market structure II.
We now consider the case when the collar is added to the market. With both the stock and
the collar being traded, investors can synthesize a larger set of possible payoffs. In particular,
they can construct trading strategies to better hedge their individual risks without bearing too
much additional risk. The new trading opportunities created by the introduction of derivative
security certainly affects the stock price and the equilibrium allocation. We have the following
proposition about the equilibrium:
Theorem 3 When Fi,t = Yt V t, w = 1/2, ji,Y = 1, 1i,z = (-1)i- 1 where i = 1,2. and under
market structure II, the economy has a linear, stationary equilibrium of the f9rm in proposition
1 for small values of ay and oz. In particular, the security prices and holdings are
1 1
St = G(raG + stt, Ht=- (- G t + A\HXt
Oi,t = hi,o - oa (oDNIi,Z - Aviz
where = stack{As , A•}, ks = (Ag,s, 0), H = (, , 0), and vi are determined by equation
(11) with aQ A (af-r) + s,'(2.1) and bQ - Abx+stack{bD,0}.
The equilibrium looks formally similar to that under market structure I. Figure 3 shows how the
price coefficients of the stock and collar change with oy and cz. Qualitatively, the stock price
coefficients behave the same way as under market structure I.
In order to see more clearly how the introduction of collar changes investors' hedging strate-
gies, let us first consider the special case when or = 0, i.e., there is no aggregate exposure to
non-traded risk. When Zt > 0, investor 1's non-traded income is positively correlated with the
stock's dividends. He then wants to short the stock to hedge the non-traded risk. The stock,
however, is an imperfect hedging vehicle since its price can changes as Gt changes. which gives
rise to a basis risk. When the collar is introduced, its price only depends on Gt. Consequently,
investors can use it to completely eliminate the basis risk. In particular, investor 1 can short
the stock to hedge the non-traded risk and long the collar to offset the basis risk incurred from
his stock position. The net position of the stock and the collar provides a perfect hedge against
the hedgable part of the non-traded risk. 9 Investors now can hedge more aggressively using the
off-setting positions in the stock and the collar. Consequently, the level of trading in the stock
increases significantly as the collar is introduced. The results carry over to the general case when
9The non-traded risk also has a non-hedgable part, associated with wN,t, which is independent of the returns
on all traded securities (i.e., the stock and the collar).
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Figure 3: Price coefficients of the stock and collar plotted against 0 y and az under symmetric information
and market structure II. The parameters are set at the following values: p = 0.1, y = 20, r = 0.05,
aG3 = -0.2, ay = -0.2, az = -0.5, aD = 0.7, orc = 0.2, aN = 0.2, 'DN = 0.6.
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there is aggregate exposure to non-traded risk, except that now the collar can only be used to
partially reduce the basis risk of stock.
Figure 4 illustrates the different components in investor 1's trading strategies in both markets.
Only h,z and hif are shown there since the other components are the same as under market
structure I. As discussed earlier, hs ,z < 0 since investor 1 uses the stock to hedge his non-traded
risk, and hf,z > 0 since he uses the collar to reduce the basis risk. Comparing figure 4 with
figure 2, we observe that the absolute value of hs', is much larger under market structure II than
under market structure I, reflecting the increase in stock trading when the collar is introduced.
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Figure 4: Investor l's trading policies, plotted against ay and az under symmetric information and market
structure II. The parameters are set at the following values: p = 0.1, y = 20, r = 0.05, aG = -0.2,
ay = -0.2, az = -0.5, aD = 0.7, oG = 0.2, aN = 0.2, KDN = 0.6.
In order to see more clearly the impact of derivative trading on the equilibrium, we illustrate
in figure 5 the differences in stock risk premium and price volatility between market structure
I and II. From the above discussion, opening trading in the collar allows investors to better
hedge their idiosyncratic non-traded risk. This tends to reduces the individual risk they are left
with. Consequently, the stock price becomes less sensitive to changes in the aggregate exposure
to non-traded risk. Thus, the risk premium and price volatility of the stock decrease. Figure
5(a) shows that the risk premium on the stock, as measured by JA'J, decreases as the derivatives
market opens, and figure 5(b) shows that the stock price volatility also decreases.
5. The case of asymmetric information.
We now study the equilibrium of the economy under asymmetric information. We will examine
how market incompleteness affects its information efficiency, the resulting equilibrium allocation
and security prices.
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Figure 5: Percentage change in stock risk premium JA'j and price volatility as from market structure I to
II under symmetric information, plotted against ay and az. The parameters are set at the following values:
p = 0.1, y = 20, r = 0.05, aG = -0.2, ay = -0.2, az = -0.5, OD = 0.7, oa = 0.2, aN = 0.2, KDN = 0.6.
For simplicity, we let /1,y = 31,z = 1 and 02,Y = 32,z = 0 in this section. Hence only class-1
investors face non-traded risk. The non-traded income of investor 1 now has the form dNl,t =
(Yt + Zt)bNdwt. We will assume that layl < lazI. Thus Yt and Zt correspond, respectively,
to the relatively more persistent and more transitory components of investor l's exposure to
non-traded risk. We assume that class-1 investors observe the actual dividend growth Gt, their
exposure to non-traded risk, Yt and Zt, as well as realizations of their non-trade income Nt.
Class-2 investors, however, only observe publicly available information, which include dividends
paid on all traded securities and their market prices. Thus, YF1 ,t = Ft and F2,t = Ft{c P}  .F,t.
The actual form of F2,t crucially depends on the market structure.
In what follows, we first make some general statements about the equilibrium under asym-
metric information in the current setting. The actual equilibrium is then examined under market
structure I and II.
5.1. General discussions on equilibrium.
Under asymmetric information, class-2 investors do not observe all the underlying state vari-
ables, in particular the actual dividend growth and class-1 investors' exposure to the non-traded
risk. Their trading policies then depend on their expectations of the unobserved variables. Con-
sequently, their expectations will affect the market prices of traded securities and the equilibrium
allocations. Thus the state of the economy under asymmetric information depend not only on
the underlying state of the economy, but also on the less informed investors' expectations. Let
=- E['.1F 2,t] denote class-2 investors' conditional expectation of variable .. In the economy de-
Caors 0 -a-, ]ls~r
sigma-y
fined here, 9t - stack{Gt, Yt, Zt} is the vector of state variables that class-2 investors do not
directly observe. et - E[e-.F2,t] then gives their conditional expectation and At = e t-et
their estimation error. Note that E[AtlF 2.t] = 0. Replacing Xt as a state vector, we now need
Xl,t = stack{1, Gt, Yt, Zt, At} = stack{Xt, At}. More generally, higher moments of class-2 in-
vestors' conditional expectation can also come in as part of the state vector. However, in a
linear equilibrium we consider in this paper, the first moments will be sufficient. For future
convenience, also define X 2,t - stack{1,Ot} = E [XtlF 2,t] = Xt. For convenience in exposition,
let AGt = Gt -Gt and AYt = Yt -yt.
In a linear equilibrium, the expected cash flows and market prices of all traded securities are
linear functions of the state variables. The linearity requires that
Ct = (+,cXl,,ds + bdws) (12a)
Pt = APXi,t. (12b)
Let AP (AP, A, AP) and Ac (Ag, A, A). Since Ct, Pt C_ T2,t, we must have (A-APX)Ot =
(A, - AP)t. If the rank of AP is greater than or equal to three, which is the number of
state variables unobservable to investor 2, the equilibrium will be fully revealing. Thus in the
remaining discussions, we assume that the rank of (Ag-A/) is less than 3 and the equilibrium
is not fully revealing. Furthermore, we can write (Ag-A,)A t = 0. Let m = 3 - ran k {A - A}.
It follows that the dimension of investor 2's estimation errors is 3 - m. Let At be the su bvector
of At that is not mutually dependent. We then have At = adt, where a is full-ranked iinatrix
of order 3 x (3-m). For future convenience, we define the reduced form sub-state vectors.
Xl,t-= (1, Yt, Zt, At,) and X2,t - (1,Yt, Zt).
Note that observing Pt is equivalent to observing (A -Ap)Ot. Define Ot = stack({C,. (Ap-
A)eGt}. Pt gives the information of class-2 investors, i.e., Y2,t -= Ft . We now can derive
class-2 investors' expectation of Ot given F2,t. First,
dOt = aeOt + bedwt
where ae = diag{aG, ay, az} and be = stack{bG, by, bz}. Next note that
d = (aO + a9t4 +- agt) dt + bdw
where a stack ,0}, tack{(Ac-A'), (AP-A,)ae}, a~ stack{A- 0}. and b -,
stack{bc, (AP - AP)be}. Let o = E[Atl.F2,t] denote the conditional covariance matrix of the
'
0For a more detailed discussion on the nature of equilibrium under asymmetric information, see Wang (1993).
unobserved state variables by class-2 investors. It then follows that o is deterministic and
d)t = asetdt + k (dAt - E [dPt F2.t]) (13a)
o = (aeo+oa') + bOb' - k (b,b'f) k' (13b)
where k = (oa' +bob' )(bdb' )- 1 [see, e.g. Lipster and Shriyayev (1979)]. Also,
d.t = adAtdt + b.dwt
where az and b, are the sub-matrices of the first (3-rn) rows of matrices (ae-ka,,)a and kb,-be,
respectively. Furthermore,
dXi,t = ai,.X•Xi,tdt + bi,.dwi,t, i = 1, 2
where all, = diag{0, a., aa}, bl,. = stack{0,,, b,  a}, 2,x = diag{0, ae}, b2,x = stack{0, kb,},
dwi,t = dwt and dw 2,t = (bsb')-lb,(dt - E [dt I7T2,t]).
Given the dynamics of investor 2's conditional expectations, the excess share returns on the
risky securities can be expresses as
dQt = dCt + dPt - rPtdt = al,QXl,tdt + bQdwt
where al,Q = AP (al,k--rL)+Ac and bQ = A"bl,x + bc. The expected excess share returns then
are
E [dQtljTi,t] = ai,QXi,tdt, i = 1, 2
where a2,Q = [A +A (a2,--rt)]. Since Xi,t follows a Gaussian 'Markov process under the
filtration Ti,t, it fully characterizes the investment opportunities for investor i.
Applying the results in appendix A.1. we obtain the following proposition about the equi-
librium under asymmetric information:
Proposition 2 Suppose that Fl,t = Ft, F2 , t{C P} ,,Y i. = +()i-1], and i = 1, 2.
In a linear, stationary equilibrium of the form (12), the investors' optimal policies and value
functions are
,t = rWi,t- - vii - - In r, O;,t = hi=i,t
27 t
Ji,t = -e-Pt-r-yW,,t+ •LY vl', Xt
where i = 1,2, hi = (rybQb)' (ai,Q+bQbY,xvi-rYbQb'•,•). Here, vi and A satisfy the following
equations:
0 = (ry)2 h, (bQb') hi - (rI3ib,+vibi,x) (ry)3ib,+vibi,x)' rvi - a,xVi-+-iai,x)Q0( 
I X I I )
1- (i 1 ) (14a)
1(m1) = whl + (1-w)h2r (14b)
where i = 2(r-p-rln r)+tr(b,xvibi,x), di = 5+2(-1)' - 1 and 7 = (L,6).
Similar to proposition 1, the above proposition only provides a characterization of a linear,
stationary equilibrium of the economy under asymmetric information if it exists. In the rest
of this section, we will examine the existence and the properties of equilibrium under market
structure I and II.
5.2. Equilibrium under market structure I.
The economy under asymmetric information and market structure I is similar in spirit to the
model considered in Wang (1993). Instead of exogenously introduce noise into the market, here
we explicitly model investors' allocational trading which endogenously introduces noise into the
market and prevents market prices from revealing too much information. We have the following
result on the equilibrium under market structure I.
Theorem 4 When Fi,t = Ft, F2 ,t = {C'P} 3i, -= i,z = [1+ (-l1)-1], where i = 1,2, and
under market structure I, there exists a linear stationary equilibrium of the form in theorem 2
forw close to 1. In particular, Xt = Xl,t = (1,Yt, Zt,Gt-Gt, Yt-Yt)', X 2,t = (1,Yt, Zt),
Oi,t = hij i,t
where s = (A, A, , Ay, A,z), hi = (h1 ,o, hl,y , hl,z, hl,,) and h2 = (h 2,0, h2,, h2,z)
are determined by (14).
The state vector now includes class-2 investors' estimation errors of Gt and Yt. Given that they
observe the stock price, which reveals the following combination of the unobserved state variables
(T-aG G) G + (As - As,) Yt + (A -As) Zt, the estimation error in Zt can be expressed as a
linear combination of the estimation errors of Gt and Yt.
The above existence result is based on a continuation argument (see appendix B). Knowing
that a unique equilibrium exists at uo = 1, we can show the generic existence of an equilibrium
for w close to one by appealing to the continuity of equation (14). The proof, however, does
not yield explicitly the range of w where the continuation can be extended to. In our numerical
solutions, we always start from the equilibrium at w = 1 and then reduce w gradually to get to
the particular value we want.
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Figure 6: Conditional variance of Gt and Y, for class-2 investors under market structure I and asymmetric
information. The parameters are set at the following values: p = 0.1, 'y = 20, r = 0.05, aG = -0.2,
ay = -0.2, az = -0.5, •a = 0.7, ao = 0.2, av = 0.2, KON = 0.6.
An important element in characterizing the equilibrium is the information asymmetry be-
tween the two classes of investors. It can be measured by investor 2's conditional variance of
the unobserved state variables, oGG -E [(Ct-Gt)27 2,t] and Oyy - E [(t-Yt)2' 2,t]. OGG
measures the information asymmetry concerning future cash flows of the stock, and oyy mea-
sures the information asymmetry concerning class-1 investors' hedging needs. The conditional
variance of Zt, ozz, is omitted since it can be expressed as linear function of o GGand ory (see
the discussions in section 4.1). Figure 6 plots oGG and ory against aor and w. The effects of oz
on oGG and ary are similar to those of at.
As oy increases, class-1 investors trade more in the stock to hedge their non-traded risk.
The increase in allocational trading introduces additional movements in the stock price and
reduces its informativeness about future cash flows. Thus oGG increases with cr.. Increasing
w, however, has two off-setting effects. On the one hand, as the fraction of informed investors
increases, more information is impounded into the prices through their speculative trading. On
the other hand, the amount of allocational trading also increases when more informed investors
are hedging their non-traded risk. The net change in oGG as w increases depends on which of the
two effects dominates. In the case shown in figure 6(a), oGG increases with w. The behavior of
oyy can be analyzed similarly. In particular, increasing or increase the variability in Yt, hence
can increase oyy. But it also increases the allocational trading and stock price sensitivity to
changes in Yt, hence makes the price more informative about Yt.
Figure 7 illustrates how the stock risk premium and price volatility change with the un-
certainty in class-1 investors' exposure to non-traded risk oy and their population weight w,
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Figure 7: Stock risk premium and price volatility under market structure I and asymmetric information.
The parameters are set at the following values: p = 0.1, y = 20, r = 0.05, aG = -0.2, ay = -0.2, az = -0.5,
0
o = 0.7, ua = 0.2, 0z = 0.4, aN = 0.2, KDN = 0.6.
respectively. For the given set of parameter values, the risk premium IAIJ increases with ay
and decreases with w. This pattern mirrors the pattern in oGG, i.e., the risk premium increases
(decreases) when the information asymmetry between the two classes of investors increases (de-
creases). Clearly, as class-2 investors become less informed, they will demand higher premium
to compensate the increase in their perceived uncertainty about future stock dividends.
The stock price volatility increases with cry when w is close to one, i.e., when there is a
large population of class-1 investors. This result is quite intuitive since higher a, gives higher
volatility in class-1 investors' hedging demands, which determines the price volatility when w is
close to one. For w close to zero, however, the stock price volatility first decreases with ay and
then starts increasing. In this case, the stock price varies for two reasons: changes in class-1
investors' hedging needs and changes in class-2 investors' expectation of future dividends. On the
one hand, increasing ay increases the volatility of class-1 investors' hedging needs, hence tends
to increase price volatility. On the other hand, increasing oy reduces the amount of information
class-2 investors extract from prices about future dividends. Less information tends to reduce
the variability in their expectation of Gt and the price volatility. This second effect tends to
dominate when the population of class-2 investors is large.
5.3. Equilibrium under market structure II
The introduction of the collar changes the risk allocations in the market as discussed in the case
of symmetric information. It also has significant impact on the informational efficiency of the
market when there is asymmetric information. Introducing a derivative security has the direct
impact of providing additional sources of information to the less informed investors through its
market prices. In addition, it has the indirect impact of changing the information content in the
prices of existing securities by changing the patterns of investors' allocational trading as well as
their informational trading. The interaction between these two can give rise interesting changes
in equilibrium as the collar market opens.
The formal results about the equilibrium is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 5 When .F,t = Tt, '2 ,t = t{ c'P), 3 i,y = iA,z = ½[1+(-1)i-'], where i = 1,2,
and under market structure II, the economy has a linear, stationary equilibrium of the form in
theorem 2 forw close to 1. In particular, Xt = il,t = (1,Yt,Zt,Gt-Gt)', k 2,t = (1,t, Zt),
St = AsXt, Ht = AHXt
1,t = hlXl,t, 92,t = h2 X 2 ,t
where AS = (1, ,\, S, jG H H= (17,A,,AHG), h1 H= (hlo, hi,y, hl,z, hl,,G) and h2 =
(h2.0, h2,y, h2,z) are determined by (14).
For class-2 investors, there are three unobservable state variables, Gt, Yt and Zt. The prices
of the stock and the collar, however, provide two endogenous signals as linear functiotns of the
unobserved variables. Thus there is only one degree of uncertainty remaining. The estimating
errors of the three variables are then perfectly correlated.
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Figure 8: Conditional variance of Gt and Yt for investor 2 under market structure I and II under .vrntretrinc
information. The parameters are set at the following values: p = 0.1, y = 20, r = 0.05. n,, = -0.2,
ay = -0.2, az = -0.5, 0D = 0.7, ~a = 0.2, tz = 0.4, .N = 0.2, oDN = 0.6.
Again, we first examine how the information asymmetry between the two classes of' investors
changes with ay and w. Figure 8 shows oGG and o,, for different values of ay and ý. As in the
case of market structure I, oGG can either increase or decrease with w, the fraction of class-l (i.e.,
the informed) investors. As oa increases, oyy increases when the population of class-1 investors
w is small, also similar to the result under market structure I. However, when the population
of class-1 investors is large (i.e., close to one), oGG increases with ay initially but then starts
decreasing.
Figure 9 plots the risk premium and price volatility of the stock for different values of ay
and w. They behave in the similar way as under market structure I.
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Figure 9: Stock risk premium and price volatility under market structure II and asymmetric information.
The parameters are set at the following values: p = 0.1, y = 20, r = 0.05, ag = -0.2, ay = -0.2, az = -0.5,
D- = 0.7, aG = 0.2, Oz = 0.4, oN = 0.2, KDN = 0.6.
5.4. Comparison between market structure I and II.
In order to analyze the impact of derivatives trading on the informational efficiency of the
securities market, we now compare the equilibrium of the economy under market structure I
and II.
We first consider the change in oGG from market structure I to II, which is plotted in figure
10 for different values of ao and w. For most values of oy and ; under consideration, oGG
decreases from market structure I to II, indicating that the information asymmetry between the
two classes of investors about the stock's future cash flow decreases after the introduction of
collar. However, for certain values of w and ay, especially when w is small, the introduction of
collar trading can increase the information asymmetry in the market about the stock's future
cash flow. In general, oy, decreases from market structure I to market structure 11. This is
not surprising since the addition of collar allows class-1 investors to more actively hedge their
non-traded risks. The increase in their hedging activities reveals more information through the
stock and collar prices about their hedging needs.
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Figure 10: Relative change in information asymmetry, as measured by class-2 (uninformed) investors' con-
ditional variance of future dividends and class-1 (informed) investors' exposure of non-traded risk, from
market structure I to II, for different values of w and ay. The figure in the right panel plots the intersection
at oy = 0.3. Other parameters are set at the following values: p = 0.1, - = 20, r = 0.05, aG = -0.2,
ay = -0.2, az = -0.5, oD = 0.7, aG = 0.2, 0 z = 0.4, oN = 0.2, KDN= 0.6.
Using a static, noisy rational expectations setup, Grossman (1977) argues that adding secu-
rities to the market should reveal more private information through a larger set of prices and
improve its informational efficiency. His results depend on the assumption that the allocational
trading (or noise trading) is exogenously specified and unchanged as new securities are intro-
duced. But allocational trading cannot be exogenously specified, especially when we consider
changes in the market structure. As we discussed in section 3, when the collar is introduced, in-
vestors change their stock trading significantly. An increase in allocational trading can actually
make stock prices less informative about its payoffs. In the case that the loss of information con-
tained in the stock price exceeds the gain of information from the collar price, the information
asymmetry in the market increases as the collar is introduced. Thus, opening the derivatives
market can actually reduce the informational efficiency of the market.
We now can examine the differences in equilibrium stock price between market structures
I and II. Figure 11(a) demonstrates changes in stock risk premium when the market structure
changes from I to II for different values of w and or,. At w = 1, the economy is only populated
with class-1 investors, hence becomes a case of identical investors. Changing market structure
does not change the equilibrium and security prices since the market is effectively complete in
this case. For most values of w < 1, opening the collar trading decreases the stock risk premium
since it reveals more information to class-2 (uninformed) investors about future stock dividends.
However, for certain values of cray when w is small, the stock risk premium can increase with the
opening of the collar trading. Not surprisingly, the values of oy and w for which the premium
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Figure 11: Relative change in stock risk premium and price volatility from market structure I to II under
asymmetric information, for different values of w and ovy. The figure in the right panel plots the intersection
at ay = 0.3. Other parameters are set at the following values: p = 0.1, y = 20, r = 0.05, a0 = -0.2,
ay = -0.2, az = -0.5, 9D = 0.7, ao = 0.2, az = 0.4, aN = 0.2, zDN = 0.6.
increases correspond to the same values for which the information asymmetry among investors
increases from market structure I to II.
Figure 11(b) shows changes in stock price volatility when the market structure changes from
I to II for different values of w and oay. The impact on stock price volatility by introducing
the collar into the market is ambiguous. It can either decrease or increase the stock price
volatility, depending on the parameter values. When the economy is mostly populated with
class-1 investors (but not completely), collar trading tends to reduce price volatility, which is
similar to the case under symmetric information. When the economy is mostly populated with
class-2 investors, the effect of information asymmetry is important. Here, for certain ranges of
ao, the stock price volatility increases when the collar trading opens.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the impact of derivative trading on the allocational and informational
efficiencies of the securities market in a fully rational expectations framework. We show that
endogenous changes in investors' allocational trading can make the market informationally less
efficient when new derivatives are introduced. We also show that introducing derivatives can
increase the stock risk premium and price volatility.
Appendix
A.1. Solution for investors' optimization problem.
This appendix considers the solution to investors' control problem when the vector of expected
excess share returns on all risky securities follows a continuous Gaussian Markov process. This
result will be used repeatedly in further deriving the equilibrium of the economy in different
situations.
Suppose that given the information of an investor i, YFt, the vector of excess share returns is
governed by the process
dQt = aQXtdt + bQdwt
dXt = axXtdt + bxdwt
where wt denotes the innovations under YFt. Here, we have omitted the index i for YFt and
wt for simplicity in notation. Also suppose his non-traded income follows the process dNt =
(PXt)bNdwt. Further assume that aQ, ax,, b,, bx, bN and / are constant over time. The investor's
optimization problem can then be stated as
Jt = sup E[ - e-P(s- t) - Ycs1ds FTt
c, 0 it
s.t. dWt = (rWt-ct)dt + 8'dQt + ( 3Xt)bNdwt
where {c, 0} belong to the feasible policy set. We solve this problem by conjecturing that his
value function has the form Jt = e-P - r'Y Wt+XIvXt. It is easy to verify that Jt satisfies the
Bellman equation when v solves the following equation:
0 (ry)2h'aQQh - (rypbN -vbx) (rybN -vbx)'+ rv - (vax+axv) - 5l(n) (A.1)
where
1h- - , (aQbQb' v-r-ybb') .
r-yQ X 
N
Also, Jt satisfies the specified transversality condition. In this case, Jt is indeed the value
function and the optimal policies are
1 1
ct = rWt - -XtvXt - - In r, Ot = hXt.
2 Y
Thus, the solution to the investors' optimization problem reduces to solving the algebraic matrix
equation (A.1).
We now consider the solution to (A.1). Define three matrices m2, ml and mo by
m2 m2 = bx [ - b'(bQb'b)-'b,'b,
m, = bkb'aQ' Q(aQ-rybQb',i3') + (t-ak + ry/3byb' (A.2)
1 1 1 11, ,, _ ,(n,n)
om =(a - rybQb'3')' (aQ- rybQb'/3') - (r-y N) 2/' / - ,
(A.1) can then be expressed as
mo0m o + m1 v + vml - vm 2 m12v = 0. (A.3)
(A.3) is called the algebraic Riccati equation. The algebraic Riccati equation in generl have
multiple solutions. We need the "smallest" solution for the value function. For two square
matrices m and n, we define m2 > n if m - n is positive semi-definite. The strict inequality
applies when mi - n is positive definite.
There exists the following result on the algebraic Riccati equation [see, e.g., Willems and
Callier (1991)]:
Lemma 1 If m2 and mo are full ranked, the algebraic Riccati equation (A.3) has a unique
largest (smallest) solution, which is symmetric and positive (negative) definite.
Thus, we only need m 2 and mo to be full ranked for a solution to (A.1). Let v = stack{ ('oo. F'o), (i), 0')}
where 5 is the sub-matrix of v that corresponds to the variable part of in Xt (voo correslponds
to the constant part and vo the cross part). Also let rho, rhli, fn 2 denote the sub-mat rices of 11o.
mn1 and m2 that correspond to b. We then have the following equation for 3:
f0fino ++ rinv + yin1 - frn2 r '22) = 0. (A.4)
We only need to solve for i since given f, solving vio and voo is trivial. It is obvious that iiith,i2
is positive definite, since it is the conditional variance of X given Q. Hence i22 is full rainked.
The existence of desired solution of i only requires Fno to be full ranked. The following lem I ia
is immediate:
Lemma 2 In the absence of non-traded income, the investor's control problem girytf by (A.4.1)
has a unique solution.
Proof. Given linear price, momn'- = a'o' aQ if there is no non-traded income. Here
aQ = AP(ag-rt) + Ac. Since both oar and -(ag - r) are symmetric positive definite, in =
(ag -rt)'1e (a - rt) is also symmetric and positive definite. Thus, m0 - (Amn( AcoC•) has
full rank, and so does r0n. By lemma 1, there exists unique, smallest solution to investor's
control problem. 0
If investors have non-traded income, to ensure the existence of the solution, we need to
impose conditions on the parameters so that (mo, mi) is observable.
A.2. Equilibrium Under Comriplete Market.
Proof of theorem 1. In a complete market, investors can perfectly hedge the idiosyn-
cratic risk in their non-traded income. Therefore, the equilibrium with two heterogeneous
investors is the same as the case with one representative investor who has total exposure to
non-traded risk W(/ 1,yY t + /31,zZt) + (1 - w)(0 2 ,yYt + 0 2 ,zZ) = Yt + zZt. We conjecture
a linear equilibrium with price process Pt = A'Xt. The representative agent solves his con-
trol problem as defined in appendix A.1 with market clearing condition h = 1J. Define
V = {{Vyy, vyz}; {Vyz, Vzz}}. Then i satisfies the algebraic Riccati equation (A.3). The coeffi-
cients are m2 = diag {y, •z}, mi = diagf{ - a,, - az}, mo = ry-O(1, OZ).
Let do = r272a,, di = (r-2ay)2 /4 - doa 2 , d2 = (r-2az)2 /4 - doarip, d3 = -dooz, and
d4= dFd2  , - a The condition (6) ensures that did 2 - 2d 2 > 0. Solution 3 has the
following form:
dl + d2 ± 2d 4
vyZ =+2 aT
v [(d - d2)/d 3]2 Z+ 4c)
vy 2 1 (r-2a y)+d3v +[(dl-d2)/d3]VYZ
vz = [(r-2az) + d3v~I - [(d-d2)/d3/Y,,]
1 2r
Voy = voZ = 0, 0oo = ryA7 + (a vy+L z) + (r-p-rln r)
r r
Note we have four different roots for 'i corresponding to the four choices of Vyz. We denote f-
as the one corresponding to
yZ=/ dI 2 + d2 - 2d4
yZ -=- [(di - d 2 )/d 3 12 + 4.y. Z
It is easy to check that the difference matrix between D- and the other O's is always negative
definite. Therefore, D- maximizes investors' value function Jt = -e - pt- r W I +\ x 't : I' . Having
solved ýi, we can easily solve A' from the market clearing condition and consequently v =
diag{voo, li}. The equilibrium stock price is
St = 1 Gt + \•gt
r - aG
where
As -=r(DN IVYZ _Z +-z-V ZZ)(r-az-aoVzz) (r-a)- vo,2vyy) - V212
XS -rDN YZ YZY a
z - (r-az-o2vzz)(r-ay-- vyy) - z 2 2
As = 21 2 2 220 [D+T- a)2 G+AyOy Y+A ZcZ
The optimal consumption policy is
ct = rWt - ,-'Xt t- -Inr
Using optimal consumption policy, we can solve the price for any traded security using
rPtdt = Et [U'(ctjt¶+dt) (dCt+dPt)
where u' denotes investor's marginal utility, and Ct = ff f(Xt, t)dt + bcdws is the cumulative
payoff for the security. Using Ito's lemma, we can get the following differential equation for any
price process P.
rP = oP+ f + X'a'2OxP+ tr ( xxOP) -[ryAsbx + (rypbN-vbx) Xt] (bDOxP+b'c) (A.5)
where 3 = (0, 1, 3z).
A.3. Proof of proposition 1 and 2.
Proof of proposition 1. Given linear stock price Pt = A'Xt, the expected returns on the
securities follow continuous Gaussian Markov process. Applying the result in appendix A.1, we
conclude that v satisfying (11a) solves investors' control problem. To show that the economy is
in equilibrium, we only need to check that under this linear price, investors' total demand clears
the market. The market clearing condition is described by equation (11b). Therefore, solving
the equilibrium under linear price is equivalent to solving the system (lla)-(llb). [
Proof of proposition 2. It is similar to the symmetric case. As shown in section 5.1, under the
linear price, the uninformed investors' conditional expectation of the unobserved state variables
solves the Riccati equation in (13b). Also, the expected returns on the securities follow continu-
ous Gaussian Markov process. From appendix A.1, we know that v satisfying (14a) solves both
investors' control problems. The market clearing condition should be
1 ' -) = JhlXl,t + (1-w)h2X 2,t
As defined in section 5.1,
X 2,t = stack{1, t} = stack {1, A,+&,} = stack {1, ca-At+Ot} = (', a)Xl,t
Thus, we have (14b) as market clearing condition. Solving the equilibrium under linear price is
then equivalent to solving the system (13b), (14a) and (14b). 0
A.4. Existence proofs.
In this section, we prove the existence of a solution to the systems described in theorem 2 and 3
using Implicit Function Theorem[see, Protter and Morrey (1991)]. The proof sketches as follows:
First, we'show that for a fixed parameter, the system has a solution. Then, we show that at the
solution, Jacobian matrix is generically non-degenerate.
Definition 1 Let D be an open set in Rn. A function f : D --+ Rm is called generically non-
degenerate if the n-dimensional Lebesgue measure of its zero set {x : f(x) = 0} equal to 0.
Therefore, by Implicit Function Theorem, the system has a solution in a neighborhood of the
initial parameter.
Lemma 3 (Implicit Function Theorem) Let D be an open set in Rm+n containing the point
(zo, yo). Suppose that F : D -+ Rm is continuous and has continuous first partial derivatives in
D. Suppose that
F(xo, yo) = 0 and det(VxF(xo, yo)) 0 . (A.6)
Then positive numbers E~ and Ey can be chosen so that:
1. the direct product of the closed balls Bm (xo, Ex) and Bn (yo, Ey) with centers at zo, yo and
radii Ex and Ey, respectively, is in V;
2. ex and ey are such that for each y E B,(yo, Ec) there is a unique x E Bm (xo, Ec) satisfying
F(x, y) = 0. If f is the function from B,(yo, Ey) to Bm(xo, E,) defined by these ordered pairs
(x,y), then F(f(y), y) = 0; furthermore, f and all its partial derivatives are continuous
on Bn(yo, Ey).
Lemma 4 Let f : D -+ R be a real analytic function, where D = D 10 ... ® Dn is an open subset
of Rn . Let A - {x E D : f(x) = 0} be its zero set. Then either MN = V or ;,(AM) = 0 where i,
is the n-dimensional Lebesgue measure.
Proof. We will prove by induction. First note that N is closed and therefore measurable. For
n = 1, Ai is either finite, or has an accumulation point. In the latter case we have from [see,
Ahlfors (1979)] that the function f is identically zero on D. Noting that any finite set has zero
Lebesgue measure concludes this part of proof.
Let us assume the conclusion of the lemma holds for certain k > 1 and prove it for n = k + 1.
Denoting f as a function of two variables f(t, x) on D1 •V2 , where D2 = D20 ..- 0Dk+1. We see
that f is a real analytic function in both t and x separately as well. Consider the set S = {t E
D1 : Vx e V 2, f(t, x) =0}. For t 'S we have fD2 f(t, x) dx = 0 by the inductive assumption. If set
S is finite, it is of zero Lebesgue measure in D1. Therefore ft,(N) = fD1 f 2 If (t,x)=o dx dt = 0
by Fubini theorem [see, e.g., Doob(1991)]. If, on the other hand, S is not finite, then it has
an accumulation point. From the result of n = 1, we see that for any fixed x E z 2 , f(t, x) is
identically zero in D 1, and therefore identically zero on D = D10VD2 which closes the proof. *
Lemma 5 Under symmetric information, system (11a)-(11b) has a solution for aOz = 0.
Proof. When az = 0, the two investors are facing the same non-traded risk. Therefore,
the market is essentially complete in the sense that no trading will occur. Applying result in
appendix (A.2), we conclude that there exists a solution. M
Proof of theorem 2. To conform to the notation of the Implicit Function Theorem, we
reformulate our system as F(x, y) = 0, where F = (F1, F2, F3), with F1, F2 corresponding
to equation (Ila) for i = 1,2, respectively, and F3 corresponding to equation (Ilb). Define
X = [[vl], [v2], A'], where [vl], [v2] are the coefficients in investors' value function, and AP is
the coefficient of the price process. (Here we use [v] to denote the vector of all non-identical
entries in matrix v.) Define y = [r, y, p,L;, aG, ay, az, aO, ea, ay, aZ, N, [KI]] ([rI] is the covariance
coefficients among all shocks) as the vector of all parameters for system (lla)-(llb). We denote
y = (9, ý), where 9 = az is the variable and 7 is rest of the parameters.
From lemma 5, 3x0o, such that F(xo, Po, y) = 0 for •o = 0. By lemma 6, the Jacobian of F at
point (xo, go, g) is generically non-degenerate. Therefore, by Implicit Function Theorem, there
exists a solution to system (lla)-(llb) for oaz close to 0. a
Lemma 6 det (VF(xo, fo, ý)) is generically non-degenerate.
Proof. Define f(ý) = det (%VF(xo, yo, ý)). It is clear that f (ý) is analytic. Also, for 0o =
[1, 1, 1,.5, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0], f(9o) $ 0. Applying the result of lemma 4, we conclude that
det (VF(xo, •o, Y)) is generically non-degenerate. U
Proof of theorem 3. The proof is similar to that of theorem 2. U
Lemma 7 Under asymmetric information, if the parameters satisfy assumption (6), then sys-
tem (13b), (14a)- (14b) has a solution for w = 1.
Proof. When w = 1, the equilibrium price should be the same as the representative investor case
with all investor being informed. This is because the uniformed investor has no impact on the
equilibrium prices. Therefore, in equilibrium, the informed investor solves his control problem
without any consideration to the uninformed investor. The uninformed then takes prices as
given and form his rational expectation about the unobserved state variable. Consequently, he
solves his control problem based on his new information set.
From appendix A.2 we know that there exists a solution to the informed investor's control
problem and the stock price process.
The uninformed investor's expectation of the unobservable state variable satisfies equation
(13b). Let a be the 3x(3-m) matrix that maps At to ,t in section 5.1, then o = a --+ ', where
-+ is full rank sub matrix of o. Simple algebra shows that equation (13b) reduces to the algebraic
Riccati equation (A.3) with m2 m' = a'a',(bb'•'a,a, mi = [a'(a' (bob'() - (bb',)'+ a's)] (3-m)x(3-m)
and mom' = [(bb ' ,)(bb')-1(bab')' + bb~9] 1(3-m)x(&..). Here I(3-.m)x(-nm) means taking the first
(3-m) x (3-m) sub matrix. Using the same argument as in appendix A.1, we can see that
m2m~ = a'Am(a'A)' where m = a'o-,l ae is symmetric and positive definite. Therefore, m2
is full rank. mom' is the sum of two covariance matrix and is therefore both symmetric and
positive definite. So, mo has full rank. We conclude that (ml, m2) is controllable and (I 0 , min1)
is observable. By lemma 1, the conditional expectation has unique positive definite solution.
The uninformed investor has no non-traded income, and he takes prices as given. Given
his rational expectation about the unobserved state variables, he solves his control problemr as
defined in appendix A.1. By lemma (2), his control problem has a solution. Thus. for 1 = ,.
system (13b), (14a)-(14b) has a solution. 0
Proof of theorem 4. To conform to the notation of the Implicit Function Theorem. we
reformulate our system as F(x, y) = 0, where F = (F1, F2 , F3 , F4) with F1, F2 correspon"ding to
(14a) i = 1, 2, respectively, F3 corresponding to (14b) and F4 to (13b).
Similar to the proof of theorem 1, we define x -- [[vl], [v2], AP, [o]] where o is uninformed
investor's conditional variance of the unobserved state variables. Define y to be the same as in
theorem 1. Denote y = (9, ), where 9 = w is the variable and ý is rest of the paraimeters.
From lemma 7, 3xo, such that F(xo, 0o, ) = 0 for go = 1. By lemma 8, the Jacobian of F is
generically non-degenerate at (xo, yo, y). Therefore, by Implicit Function Theorem, t here exists
a solution to system (13b), (14a)-(14b) for w close to 1. 0
Lemma 8 det (VxF(xo, Yo, Y)) is generically non-degenerate.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of lemma 6. Note that f(y) is analytic, and f(yo) $ 0
at 0o = [1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1,0, 0, 0, 0]. By lemma 4, we see that det (V~,F(xo, go, U)) is generically
non-degenerate. a
Proof of theorem 5. The proof is similar to that of theorem 4. a
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